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THE INTERLOCKING DEATH AND REBffiTH 
OF CONTRACT AND TORTt 
Jeffrey O'Connell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN his brilliant and elegant-if controversial-little book, The Death of Contract,1 Grant Gilmore has pointed out that when adver-
sity confronts a party to a contract, courts are now much less inclined 
to follow either traditional contract law or even contract provisions 
specifically designed to govern such a mishap. Instead, just as they 
would deal with any other "accident," courts tend to resolve the 
matter through the use of tort-like principles, and they allocate losses 
accordingly.2 A classic illustration is the contract for the purchase 
of a car that limits the seller's liability for an accident due to a defect 
in the car to the cost of repairing the defective part: In such a case, 
if an accident occurs and causes personal injury to the buyer, the 
provision is ignored. 3 Personal injury damages beyond the repair 
costs are recoverable and the contract be damned. 4 
Tort law has always been primarily concerned with picking up 
the pieces after accidents between strangers who certainly had not 
anticipated the mishap and consequently had not purported to antici-
pate how the pieces should (or should not) be picked up. But now, 
Gilmore tells us, 5 tort law is swallowing up contract law through its 
application not only in transactions between strangers but also in 
those between persons in privity; when the unexpected happens6 (in 
t This article .is based on the author's remarks at the Torts Round Table at the 
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Houston, Texas, 
December 28, 1976. 
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1951, Dartmouth College; J.D. 
1954, Harvard University. 
1. G. GILMORE, THE DEATII OF CONTRACT (1974). ' 
2. See id. at 87-99. 
3. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960). 
4. Although other examples not limited to personal injury cases or contracts of 
adhesion could be cited, this paper focuses on tort and contract as applied to per-
sonal injury cases. 
5. See G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 55-85. 
6. Even if the "unexpected" is covered in the contract, the courts often feel free 
to ignore the contract since such results were not the focal point of attention during 
the contracting process. This is especially the case in, but not limited to, consumer 
contracts. In the words of Professor Arthur Leff: 
[W]ith respect to consumer "contracts," most of the boilerplate is about con-
659 
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the form of an illness that prevents a coronation, a fire that destroys 
a crop, a late payment of a life insurance premium, or a charitable 
donor failing to honor his commitment), neither traditional contract 
law nor specific contract provisions, with their precise, orderly, de-
manding and often cruel requirements, now control. 7 Rather, as in 
the case of tort law, a concept much vaguer and more amorphous-
framed in terms such as "fairness" or "efficient allocation of re-
sources," or "reasonable behavior or expectations," or "comparative 
risk-bearing capacity"-will control. 
The first portion of this article will examine the growing inclina-
tion of courts to apply tort principles to cases based on contracts; at 
the same time, the defects of tort will be discussed insofar as they 
militate against the wisdom of so extending tort principles. In the 
last half of the article, an alternative contractual method for allocat-
ing losses in one particular area will briefly be presented; this 
method does not contain the defects in loss allocation that have im-
pelled courts to reject traditional contractual principles, but it also 
avoids many inefficiencies of traditional tort remedies. 
II. THE TANGLED HISTORY OF TORT AND CONTRACT 
The substitution of tort for contract affects not only who will bear 
the loss when the smooth world the parties normally expect at the 
time of contract suffers some vulgar intrusion of imperfect reality, 
but also how that loss will be measured. With its rigid requirements 
of offer, acceptance," and consideration, traditional contract liability 
was not only difficult to impose but relatively unprofitable as well. 
"Consequential" damages were not part of the traditional contract 
law: When a seller's defective machine injured a buyer, the buyer 
could recover only the cost of repairs, not his medical expenses or 
wage loss stemming from the injury; and if a seller failed to deliver 
machinery as promised, the buyer could recover only the difference 
between the price of the machine under their contract and the price 
the buyer paid to a substitute seller; the buyer's lost profits for the 
period he was without a machine due to the seller's breach were 
beyond recovery. 
tingencies, things that will become important only if the product or deal breaks 
down [such as the product or service resulting in unexpected personal injury]. 
It is hard to focus attention on what should not ordinarily happen, or at least 
to focus as carefully as upon what will happen for sure; i.e., the price and the 
nature of the goods. . . . 
Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Trans-
lation, 31 U. P1rr. L. REV. 349, 353 (1970). 
1. Id. at 350. This is in contrast to former days when "[t]he austerity of 
[contract] doctrine would not be tempered for the shorn lambs who might shiver in 
its blast." G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 21. 
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As Gilmore suggests, 8 however, those limitations are disappear-
ing. Courts are no longer inclined to allow the impositions of bur-
dens upon those who, in the judges' opinion, ought not to bear 
them, regardless of traditional contract law or specific contract pro-
visions. Furthermore, consequential damages far beyond the repair 
costs or the difference between the contract and m_arket price are 
now routinely imposed. 9 According to Gilmore, 
[W]e are fast approaching the point where to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, any benefit received by a defendant must be paid for unless it 
was clearly meant as a gift; where any detriment reasonably incurred 
by a plaintiff in reliance on a defendant's assurances must be recom-
pensed. When that point is reached, there is really no longer any 
viable distinction between liability in contract and liability in tort. We 
may [also] take the fact that damages in contract have become indis-
tinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an instinc-
tive, almost unconscious realization that the two fields . . . are gradu-
ally merging and becoming one. 
Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is 
that "contract" is being absorbed into the mainstream of "tort." Until 
the general theory of contract was hurriedly run up late in the nine-
teenth century, tort had always been our residual category of civil lia-
bility. As the contract rules dissolve, it is becoming so again.10 
Gilmore further observes, quite justifiably, that "the theory of 
tort into which contract is being reabsorbed is itself a much more 
expansive theory of liability than was the theory of tort from which 
contract was artificially separated a hundred years ago."11 Tort law, 
like old-fashioned, formalized contract law, closely limited liability. 
If the rewards were often greater under tort than under contract (in 
the form of "consequential damages"), recovering in tort was more 
difficult than recovering in contract. A claimant was required to 
prove not only the fault of his injurer but also the absence of con-
tributory fault. 12 And it was no coincidence that the thicket of tort 
law, so protective of those who might be held liable, grew up in an 
era of expanding entrepreneurial activity, for the clear purpose of the 
8. See G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 88. 
9. Id. at 83, citing Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages, 65 YALE L.J. 
992 (1956). 
10. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87, 88 (citations omitted). It is Gilmore's 
view that the general theory of contract law emerged full blown out of Dean Lang-
dell's head with the publication of his casebook in 1871, and that Langdell's thesis was 
developed by Holmes and Williston. See id. at 12-14. Gilmore's view of the birth 
of contract law has been criticized. See, e.g., Speidel, Book Review, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
1161 (1975); Epstein, Book Review, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 68 (1976). 
11. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87 (citation omitted). 
12. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS§ 65, at 416-27 (4th ed. 1971). 
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restrictions was to nurture commerce. 13 If, as Gilmore suggests, "the 
decline and fall of [traditional contract] theory . . . and, in most 
quarters, of laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflec-
tions of the transition from nineteenth century individualism to the 
welfare state and beyond,"14 then the rise of modem tort law with 
its expanded criteria and extent of liability, especially for personal 
injury, reflects the same evolution. Presently, their great extent and 
scope frequently make both contract and tort law scourges to entre-
preneurial activity. One need only observe the uproar from the 
medical profession and industry generally as premiums for medical 
malpractice and defective products liability have expanded expo-
nentially .15 
It is ironic that contract has rejoined tort just at the time when 
tort has been subjected to the most intense theoretical and practical 
attacks in its long history. The deeper irony is that critics of tort 
law are attacking it as woefully inadequate on the basis of its risk 
distribution features-the very features, it should be recalled, that 
account for the simultaneous process of tort's absorption of contract 
law. Thus, legal scholars and others relentlessly point to the tort 
system's failure to pay most accident victims, its dilatory payment to 
those who are compensated, and its gross inefficiency in using up 
most of the insurance proceeds in legal fees and insurance over-
head.16 
In light of these flaws, the longevity of tort, not to mention its 
absorption of other areas of law, is itself surprising. The vitality of 
tort law is particularly difficult to explain when one realizes that its 
fundamental weakness was perceived and extirpated, in one area at 
least, sixty years ago, through the adoption of workers' compensation 
laws. At long last, though, just as traditional tort law was banished 
from the first great area of its application-industrial accidents-it 
now faces banishment from the second great area of its application-
13. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of Torts, in U.S. 
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY: 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 1, 25-26, 30-31 (1970), 
reprinted in J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND! 
TEACHING MATERIALS ON CoMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS AND AILMENTS IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 31-32, 38-39 (1975). 
14. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95-96 (citation omitted"). 
15. It should be noted that in both cases described in the text, the cause of action 
is a subtle and complex mix of tort and contract. For a discussion of the interlocking 
application of contract and tort law in product liability cases, see Franklin, When 
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966). On medical malpractice, see 1 D. LoUISELL & H. 
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE§ 8.03, at 194-200 (1973). 
16. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 42-67, 99-143, 
170-90, 223-30, 241-53, 581-91. For a summary of and citation to much of the 
literature, see W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 84, at 556-70. 
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automobile accidents. Unless the thirty-four states without no-fault 
auto laws act within a short time, a federal no-fault law seems inevi-
table; indeed, it may be enacted regardless of _state action.17 A 
further irony in the switch of common-law courts from contract to 
tort criteria is that the statutory solutions for industrial accidents and 
auto accidents simplified the insured event by a switch from tort to 
contract-like criteria. 
The liability rules applied by workers• compensation and no-fault 
auto statutes, like traditional contract rules, are viewed by some as 
harsh, undifferentiated, and often unfair;18 but they also have con-
tract's traditional virtues of simplicity, clarity, and ease of administra-
tion. For example, some find it unfair ·that liability is imposed on 
an employer to his employee or a motorist to a pedestrian, even 
though the employer or motorist is free from fault and it is the vic-
tim who is actually at fault.19 Indeed, the supposed harshness of 
such liability served as one of the main bases for early rulings that 
workers' compensation statutes were unconstitutional as a denial of 
due process of law.20 The same issues are raised with regard to 
damages, where some see as harsh the simple, but easily ascertained, 
cost-cutting limit:S of contract law applied by such statutes. In effect, 
only liquidated damages for limited wage loss (with a maximum of, 
for instance, $100 or $200 a week) can be recovered, and no dam-
ages for pain and suffering are permitted. 21 Here, too, these limits 
are perceived to be so unfair that they have served as a primary 
reason for not only striking down workers' compensation, but also 
attacking the constitutionality of auto no-fault laws. 22 
Why have legislatures turned from tort to contract-like criteria 
at precisely the time when courts are doing the opposite? The 
answer is that, for all the admitted shortcomings of workers' compen-
sation and no-fault auto laws, their far superior efficiency achieves 
much greater effectiveness-and even fairness-than tort law. 
Under traditional tort law, we litigate endlessly and at great expense 
such incredibly intractable issues as whether a motorist, doctor, 
17. For a summary of the empirical studies of the operation of no-fault laws, see 
O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. 
REV. 23 (1977); reprinted in 1977 INs. L. J. 152. 
18. See, e.g., Editorial, TRIAL, Oct-Nov. 1967, at 10-11. 
19. Id. 
20. E.g., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). 
21. See G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 48 (arguing that "a restrictive approach 
toward damage recovery seems a necessary component of any idea of absolute 
liability"). 
22. See note 20 supra and accompanying text; Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 
283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (dictum). 
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manufactured product, or accident victim was at fault23 and the pre-
cise extent of loss of the accident victim, including the pecuniary 
value of non pecuniary loss (pain and suffering). 24 These tort 
criteria are astonishingly complex and cumbersome when compared 
to the contract criteria that govern most insurance policies. Life or 
health insurance proceeds, for example, are not withheld if injury 
could have been prevented by the exercise of due care. 2r; 
In a brilliant spoof, which merits lengthy quotation, torts 
professor Willard Pedrick has pointed out how ludicrous it would be 
to tum from contract to tort for most insurance payments: 
[I]n the field of fire losses the courts have been largely aban-
doned in favor of almost exclusive reliance on insurance [contracts] 
to spread or distribute losses instead of fixing blame and pinning the 
loss on the person whose fault caused the loss in the first place. Since 
loss of life and destruction of property is excessive under this system 
of loss distribution, it is appropriate to consider the benefits that might 
be expected to come from changing the system . . . to provide for 
judicial determination of individual responsibility for fire losses. 
. . . [F]ires for the most part are not accidents. In a great many 
fire situations, someone has been at fault, has deliberately taken a 
chance or has failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man. 
Whether it be in connection with smoking and use of matches, 
electrical wiring and appliances, cooking and heating equipment and 
other fire hazard activities, the human factor figures in a large portion 
of ... fires. 
To shift from the present "the insurance will pay for the fire" atti-
tude [of contract] to a judicially supervised [tort-like] assessment of 
individual responsibility will be a real shift. It ought to be possible 
to alter the system and the behavior of persons within the system, 
however, so that for very large numbers of fires, some sort of adver-
sary claim, either within the family or against some outsider should 
result. This would offer the prospect of assessment of moral respon-
sibility for fire damage, affixing the blame, of finding the fault. 
Surely this ought to have a most salutary affect in generating sensi-
23. Under the negligence theory of tort, plaintiff must prove defendant's conduct 
faulty; under the strict liability theory of tort, plaintiff must prove defendant's product 
faulty. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §§ 28-36, 98-99, at 139-204, 656-62; cf, 
Fleming, Draft Convelllion on Products Liability (Council of Europe), 23 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 729, 732 (1975). In either case the problems of proof are similar-and 
prodigious. See R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 109 (1969); J. O'CONNELL, 
ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE IN PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 12-18 
(1915). See also note 25 infra and accompanying text. 
24. See generally M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 416-41 (1971 ), 
25. See Needed: A Basic Reform of Auto Liability Insurance, 27 CONSUMER 
REP. 404, 406 (1962), 
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tivity to fire hazards with the prospect of dramatic reduction in the 
number and severity of fires. Moreover the assessment of fault and 
the solemn setting of the judicial trial contribute to the satisfactions 
of a well ordered society. It is good to know that wrongdoers will 
be brought to book, that anti-social conduct does not go unnoticed 
and unpunished. Moreover, to develop a system for assessing indi-
vidual responsibility for fire losses will bring this part of the law into 
harmony with the vast areas of tort law where fault and individual 
responsibility are widely accepted as the sound way for dealing with 
claims for personal injury and property destruction. The legal profes-
sion can be expected to develop experts in handling fire litigation who 
will bring the art to a high level. 
The proposed improvement in the system for dealing with fire 
losses could be instituted [by] . . . fire insurance companies them-
selves . . . by the simple expedient of rewriting the basic fire insur-
ance contract to provide that losses will be paid only in those cases 
where the insured has no [tort] claim against another-either within 
or without the family. That change should do much to encourage 
litigation with all of its satisfactions.26 
Professor Pedrick brings a smile to one's face through the 
rhetorical device of reductio ad absurdum as he illustrates the sense-
lessness of abandoning contract for tort. Yet the smile disappears 
when one realizes that, as Professor Gilmore tells us, 27 this very 
absurdity is being solemnly achieved by the courts. 
Ill. ALLOCATION OF LOSSES AND THE PROBLEM OF 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
The shift by courts from contract to tort principles of loss alloca-
tion has not gone unchallenged. As one might imagine, the 
absurdity is particularly resented at the University of Chicago-that 
temple of the marketplace's contract economics. Thus, in an article 
entitled Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract,28 Professor 
Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law School argues that 
the solution to tort law's mishandling of personal injury law lies in 
allowing tortfeasors and their potential victims almost complete free-
dom to contract away tort liability. He would, illustratively, allow 
doctor and patient to contract for no liability for negligent treatment, 
or for limited liability, which might take the form of a ceiling on the 
26. Pedrick, Tangential Introduction, in WALTER E. MEYER RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
OF LAW, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBILE VICTIM vii-xii (1968) (citations 
omitted). 
27. See G. GILMORE, note 1 supra, at 87-99. Actually, some readers took Ped-
rick seriously. 
28. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUN-
DATION RESEARCH J. 87. 
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dollar recovery for any negligent act or recognition of liability only 
for acts of gross negligence. Such a device, Professor Epstein as-
serts, could dramatize the virtues of decentralization by private 
decisionmaking and would make it possible to avoid the cumbersome 
attempts by the courts to apply public law solutions (such as redis-
tributing income from large corporations or insurance companies to 
injured individuals) to private law problems.29 Although Epstein 
applies his principle only to medical malpractice, he asserts that "its 
implications extend to all areas of private law."30 
Given current circumstances, Epstein seems to go too far, as he 
himself realizes. Modem courts are very unlikely to uphold a con-
tractual provision between a doctor and his patient, or a manu-
facturer and its customer, if the provision's only function is to abolish 
or dramatically limit common-law tort rights.31 That, of course, is 
precisely Gilmore's point. The courts would look at such an ar-
rangement from a tort perspective, and contractual provisions pur-
porting to control tort-like consequences would be ignored. Even a 
reduction in the contract price for the proffered goods or services 
in light of the reduction of tort liability is unlikely to assuage the 
courts' hostility to any bartering away of common-law tort rights, es-
pecially where parties unequal in bargaining power are contracting 
with regard to personal injury.32 
Nor is the distrust of contract limited to courts; other branches 
of government often display it when they concern themselves with 
consumer protection or safety standards. Professor Arthur Leff has 
perhaps best identified the reason. The government, he points out, 
whether acting through legislatures, administrative agencies, or 
29. Id. at 95, 106, 149. 
30. Id. at%. 
31. Virtually all of the general discussion of malpractice law and virtually 
all of the judicial opinions upon the subject take it for granted that the 
specification of the substantive rules of medical malpractice rests, in the absence 
of legislative command, upon the courts, and that the parties themselves are 
not free to vary those terms by private arrangement. Although most courts 
have not expressly stated the extent to which specific provisions in the ,;ihysician-
patient contract are void and unenforceable for reasons of public pohcy, some 
uneasy combination of the doctrines of "unequal bargaining power," "contracts 
of adhesion," "economic duress," and "unconscionability" today block any private 
effort to contract out of the liability rules for medical malpractice. 
R. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure 17 (paper delivered at a 
conference on The Economics of Medical Malpractice sponsored by the Center for 
Health Policy Research of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Dec. 16, 1976 [hereinafter cited as AEI Conference]. 
32. Compare Jefferson County Bank v. Armored Motors Serv., 148 Colo. 343, 
366 P.2d 134 (1961) (contract ~tween bank and armored car service limiting lia-
bility upheld), with Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 
(1962) (contract between motorist and trailer rental company exempting the latter 
from tort liability invalid as against public policy). 
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courts, is most active when the failure of a buyer of goods to protect 
himself is likely to have "serious and irreversible consequences." If, 
for example, a failure to shop carefully and diligently can lead to 
death or bodily harm, governmental regulation to achieve at least 
minimum standards for the goods in question is more likely, as in 
the case of automobile safety standards. On the other hand, when 
the risk is not of bodily harm but merely that the buyer will get less 
than he expected, government will less often intervene, except through 
devices designed to give notice to the buyer, such as the Prospectus 
requirement of the Securities Act of 1933. Thus, argues Leff, 
"when the risk to the buyer goes beyond the value of the thing bar-
gained for," the intervention of the government is most likely; for ex-
ample, the government is most likely to step in if the risk is not 
merely that one will be bilked by worthless or shoddy goods such 
as a power lawn mower that will not start, but rather that one will 
lose a foot once the mower does start. Obviously, in Leff's insight-
ful phrase, the loss of the foot "is beyond the value of the thing bar-
gained for"-namely, the lawn mower. In analyzing the cases 
closely, Leff purports to find that when the courts invoke the 
doctrine of unconscionability they seem to be implementing, though 
perhaps unconsciously, some such criterion as "risk beyond the value 
of the bargain" as a test for deciding which con.tract clauses must 
be validated (if ever validatable) by a "form of super-assent" from 
a court. ·warranty disclaimers, says Leff, present the clearest ex-
ample, for courts will tolerate least of all a contract provision 
eliminating a tort remedy against a provider of goods. This is because 
under such a provision a buyer is threatened not only with defective 
or worthless goods but also with uncompensated personal injuries. 33 
The irony, to repeat, is that the courts, in rejecting contract for 
tort because contract is so unfair to victims from a loss distribution 
perspective, drive those same victims back into an area of law that 
is itself increasingly recognized as extremely unfair from that same 
perspective. 34 
The irony is further compounded by the work of another Univer-
sity of Chicago market stalwart, Ronald Coase, whose theories are 
premised on the necessity of varying tort by means of contract if sen-
sible loss distribution is to be achieved. 35 Prior to Coase's seminal 
writing, it had long been thought that a decision in tort whether or 
33. Leff, supra note 6, at 353 n.19. 
34. See O'Connell, supra note 17; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort 
Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 
501, 529-37 (1976). 
35. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LA.w & EcoN. 1 (1960). 
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not to impose social losses on the perpetrators of a given activity 
would inevitably affect the allocation of resources. For example, if 
tort law made power lawn mower manufacturers liable for all 
damage caused by malfunctions of their mowers, then 
in theory, mower prices would then rise and sales fall; some families 
would be induced to shift to manual mowers, the total amount of 
power mowing would be reduced, and the level of accidents would 
abate. Moreover, manufacturers might become choosy about cus-
tomers, raising prices to non-institutional buyers or perhaps simply to 
obvious [incompetents]. . . . Finally, they would have an incen-
tive to redesign mowers to impose safety features. A variety of 
market forces would be set in motion to lower the total loss through 
accidents. 36 
Conversely, the traditional conclusion was that if accident costs were 
not imposed upon an activity-that is, if they are divorced from the 
activity that generates them-"then the activity in question will re-
ceive a hidden subsidy which will invite us [through the marketplace] 
to vote for more accidents than we should be willing to pay for 
if we realized their cost. "37 
Under the Coase theorem, however, optimal allocation of resour-
ces need not depend on tort-imposed liability. Regardless of the 
manner in which tort law imposes liability for losses, the parties con-
cerned will arrive at an optimal allocation of resources if they are 
allowed to contract to reshift the loss. 
The significance of the Coase theorem can be illustrated by 
reference to Sturges v. Bridgman,38 a well-known nineteenth-century 
English case. A doctor had instituted a nuisance action against a 
neighboring confectioner because the noise and vibration produced 
by the confectioner's machinery rendered useless the consulting 
room that the doctor had constructed near the property line. The 
court held that the doctor was entitled to an injunction to restrain 
the confectioner from using his machinery in a manner that would 
prevent use of the consulting room, on the ground that such a use 
constituted a serious interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of 
his own land. Professor Patrick Atiyah has described Coase's 
evaluation of the case: 
The decision is criticized by Professor Coase on the ground that 
the real question facing the court in an action of this sort is the eco-
nomic question, namely which of the services which have to be sacri-
ficed here are more valuable to society? But he also points out that 
36. Ross, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1322, 1323 (1971) (reviewing G. 
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) ), 
37. James, Book Review, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 297, 303, quoted in F. HARPER & 
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, Supp. vol. 2, at S (1968). 
38. 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). 
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since the parties could have modified the court's ruling by subsequent 
[contract] between themselves, the ruling did not, in fact, greatly 
matter from an economic point of view [of optimal allocation of re-
sources]. Thus if, for instance, the additional value to the confec-
tioner of the use of his machinery was (say) £500 a year, while the 
additional value to the doctor of the use of his consulting room at 
the end of his garden was (say) £200 a year, it would plainly 
have been in the interest of both parties for the confectioner to 
resume using his machinery, and [to contract] to pay the doctor 
anything between £200 and £500 a year [the precise point between 
£200 and £500 a year at which the bargain will be struck depending 
on their bargaining talents, etc.]. In the economic world in which 
all men are economic men, this is just what would have happened 
so that the court's original decision to grant an injunction would not 
have stopped the confectioner using his machinery. Equally, if the 
doctor's loss of income from his inability to use his consulting room 
was £500 a year and the confectioner's loss from inability to use his 
machinery was only £200, and the court had refused an injunction, 
it would have been profitable for the doctor to pay the confectioner 
anything between £200 and £500 a year not to use the machinery, 
and it would have been profitable for the confectioner to take it. So, 
once again, there is no misallocation of resources, whatever result 
[tort] law arrives at. If it places the risk on the party who should 
bear it in order to optimize the allocation of resources, the risk will 
remain there, whereas if [tort] law places the risk on the wrong 
party, the parties will correct the law's mistakes by [contract] .... 39 
A crucial assumption made both in traditional economic literature 
and in the Coase theorem that the parties can correct by contract 
any erroneous court decision concerning tort liability is that there are 
zero transaction costs. Many critics have identified this as the crucial 
problem and have dismissed Coase's theorem as meaningless pre-
cisely because it makes what one economist has called "the heroic 
assumption" that there are no negotiating or transaction costs in, for 
example, determining the exact costs imposed on the doctor by the 
conduct of the confectioner. So, too, Coase assumed away the cost 
of negotiating, drafting, and policing the contract that allocates those 
costs between the two parties. 40 Moreover, transaction costs also in-
clude expenses incurred in obtaining information. In short, because 
transaction costs involve any costs incurred by entering into and com-
pleting any designed transaction, they can amount to very significant, 
perhaps insuperable, barriers to contractual arrangements. 
In defense of Coase, he did not create the assumption of no 
transaction costs. Conventional economic theorists who preceded 
39. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1975), 
reprinted i11 J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 13, at 602-03. 
40. See Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 103, 
105 (1970). 
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Coase had postulated that it would be necessary, even without these 
costs, in order- to achieve optimal loss allocation either to shift liability 
by tort or to levy a tax in any situation where one individual engaged 
in an activity that imposed uncompensated-for costs on others. In 
other words, Coase was concerned with a problem ancillary to, and 
in fact beyond, the existence of transaction costs-namely, the sup-
posed necessity of correcting by tax or tort liability externalities im-
posed on one person by another. In ignoring transaction or negotiat-
ing costs for contracts, Coase was not adding an unrealistic com-
ponent to economic thought; rather, he was refining an aspect of con-
ventional economic thought that had itself always ignored transaction 
or negotiating costs and had assumed the existence of perfect 
competition. 
Yet the question of transaction costs obviously must be ad-
dressed. What happens when, as is commonly the case, the parties 
are not in a bargaining relationship at all? ~ Auto accident victims 
are obviously not in a contractual relation with people who cause auto 
accidents. There is, for example, no convenient means of bringing 
together all pedestrians and all owners of automobiles to bargain over 
who should bear the costs of accidents between the two groups: 
"There is, therefore, no obvious method by which if [tort] law places 
the cost on one group, that group can [contract to] shift it to another 
group."41 
The facts in Sturges v. Bridgman illustrate .a different situation, in 
which, although the parties were not originally in a bargaining situa-
tion, they were in an easy position to contract after the intervention of 
tort law. But even where a bargain is possible, we must, as Professor 
Atiyah urges, take account of "the actual costs of striking the bargain 
by which [tort] ... law's misplacing of the risk may be corrected": 42 
Here the confectioner and the doctor have to get together, negotiate, 
and perhaps draw up a contract, which then has to be implemented 
by regular payments, year by year. Let us vary our hypothetical 
figures now and assume that the value to the confectioner of his 
machinery is £500 a year and the value to the doctor of his consult-
ing r0om is £470 a year. Suppose that the cost of a bargain be-
tween the parties is £50. Now, if the court places the burden on 
the doctor and refuses an injunction, there will be a correct alloca-
tion of resources, whereas if the court grants the injunction there will 
be a misallocation, and in this case the misallocation will not be cor-
rected by a bargain because it will be too expensive to correct it. In 
this type of case therefore, the correct placing by [tort] ... law of 
the initial liability is of great importance. 48 
41. P. ATIYAH, supra note 39, at 531-32 and 602 respectively. 
42. Id. at 533 and 603 respectively. 
43. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In other words, if transaction costs were zero, the optimal result. _ 
could be achieved by having the most efficient user of the resources 
pay for the privilege of using them. But the cost of making a con-
tract and enforcing it may be greater than any marginal benefits that 
would have accrued to the confectioner under such a contract. Con-
sequently, although the confectioner is the more efficient user of the 
resources, he would not get control over them because of transaction 
costs. 
Because they deal with parties who face the market system as it 
actually operates, the courts must address this problem of transaction 
costs. And, before they adopt a rule of tort liability, they must weigh 
the effects of such a decision-a task noted by Coase, who has thereby 
recognized the potential complications caused by transaction costs. 44 
Because a particular imposition of tort liability may produce an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources that the parties may not be able to 
correct by contract, the initial imposition of tort liability becomes 
crucial. As a result, according to Coase, there are two major obliga-
tions that the courts must discharge. . First, they must attempt to de-
termine what rule of tort liability would lead to the most efficient 
resource allocation if a rearrangement of those rights by contract 
were not feasible. Second, even where a contract can effect a rear-
rangement of tort rights, the court must aim at reducing the need 
and the cost of such contractual reallocation. In other words, Coase 
concludes that, in a perfect market system, the courts need only be 
concerned with the effect of tort liability rules on income distribu-
tion. 45 (The decision of courts to redistribute income is often based 
on political or moral considerations. For example, tort law tradition-
ally decided that if one party had been at fault, he should be forced 
to redistribute his income to his faultless victim.) As far as the allo-
cation of resources is concerned, in a perfect market system there 
will be contractual reallocation of tort rights to achieve an optimal 
situation. On the other hand, in the real world of the market system 
the initial determination of tort rights will often be dispositive. 
Transaction costs may, as we have seen, prevent contracts from prop-
erly rearranging tort rights to achieve efficiency. As a result, Coase 
would have the courts, in designating who has what tort rights, con-
sider the allocation of resources that will be most efficient. 40 
In many situations, the parties do, in fact, deal with each other 
prior to the accident and thus could conceivably contract with refer-
44. Coase, supra note 35, at 15. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See id. at 13. 
46. The textual material between footnotes 43 and 46 is a paraphrasing of unpub-
lished writings by Professor Geoffrey Palmer of Victoria University, Wellington, N.Z. 
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ence to personal injury. Legal problems of medical malpractice, for 
example, often arise in a context of extensive consultation between 
the patient and the health-care provider prior to treatment, because the 
health-care provider must gain the "informed consent" of the patient 
before beginning treatment.47 By definition, the sale of products 
that may lead to product liability actions involves a contractual re-
lationship. In such situations, either the parties themselves or the 
courts (or the parties altering the court's initial determination) could 
agree to allocate any loss stemming from the sale of goods or ser-
vices by deciding who is the most efficient risk-bearer: 
In the case of products' liability, for instance, the manufacturer can 
clearly secure insurance more easily and cheaply than the consumer. 
To be weighed against this is the fact that the consumer is in a better 
position to assess the peculiar risks which need to be covered by in-
surance which arise from his own personal position (e.g., his income, 
the size of his family and so on), as well as the fact that the risk 
may vary between consumers because some may be more vulnerable 
than others, or more skillful in avoiding the danger of the defective 
product and so on. If liability is on the manufacturer, therefore, fac-
tors of this kind may tend to increase the cost of insurance, though 
to such a small extent that in this sort of case it is unlikely to counter-
balance the other considerations. In other cases, however, this factor 
could have considerable importance. If, for example, we are consid-
ering whether the law should place the risk of goods being lost at 
sea on the consignor or the carrier, the fact that the consignor knows 
more about the goods, how they should be packed, what kind of dam-
age may be incurred, and so forth may make it cheaper for him to 
insure.48 
And so, economic theory and judges following economic theory40 
conclude that there is little cause to worry about the inadequacy of 
tort rules because the parties will correct their inequality by contract. 
When this adjustment is not feasible, the economists say, the courts, 
in imposing tort liability, should hypothesize what liability the parties 
41. See 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, §§ 22.01-22.08, at 594.43-
.62. 
48. P. ATIYAH, supra note 39, at 530-31 and 601 respectively. For an early and 
provocative attempt to explore the effect of comparative loss-bearing capacity as a 
basis of tort liability, see Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 
61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952). 
49. Especially since Roger Traynor's pioneering liability decisions in California, 
more and more judges have purported to use economic criteria in personal injury 
cases. One leading authority has cast aspersions on the quality of this economic 
thinking. In discussing the development of product liability, Professor Friedrich 
Kessler of Yale Law School notes that a "theory of enterprise liability has emerged 
frequently based on vague and unanalyzed notions of public policy and economics." 
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer under Modern Sales Law, Part I, 14 YALE 
LJ. 62 (1964). For a report on federal judges taking a formal course in economics, 
sponsored by the Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami School of 
Law, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1976, § A, at 20, col. 4. 
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would have imposed if given an opportunity to contract. But con-
tract, Gilmore has shown, is dying; the courts will apply what are 
essentially tort criteria in deciding who bears the loss when contracts 
fall apart. A profound contradiction should now be apparent: How 
can the courts use contract doctrines to impose tort liability if they 
are using tort doctrines to impose contract liability? 
An example of the judiciary's struggle with this conundrum is 
found in the seminal case of Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.50 
In that case, plaintiffs intestate died in an airplane crash. Plaintiff 
sued the airline (American), the aircraft manufacturer (Lockheed), 
and the manufacturer of an allegedly defective altimeter (Kolls-
man). With some wonderful legerdemain, the Court of Appeals of 
New York imposed strict tort liability for the defective altimeter on 
Lockheed, not on Kollsman or the airline. The court airily dis-
missed any incongruity in result with a bow to, if not an express 
acknowledgment of, Ronald Coase's theorem: "Adequate protection 
is provided for the passengers by casting in liability the airplane 
manufacturer which put into the market the completed aircraft."51 
The implications of this cryptic statement are that the plaintiff needs 
only one source of payment and that the parties in the chain of trans-
mittal to the plaintiff can adjust the liability as between themselves 
by contract. An explicit statement to the same effect is found in 
another leading products liability case, Elmore v. American Motors 
Corp.,52 where the California Supreme Court said that the manufac-
turer and retailer "can adjust the cost of such protection [against 
strict products liability] between them in the course of their con-
tinuing business relationship."53 
As a crude example of the kind of bargaining by contract that 
might follow the imposition of tort liability in the Kollsman decision, 
assume that Lockheed, operating in a competitive market, can pay 
only $3,000 for altimeters; further assume that after the court deci-
sion it must pay $300 for liability insurance ascribable to altimeter-
caused accidents. It makes no practical difference whether Lock-
heed pays $2,700 for altimeters and $300 for insurance or whether, 
alternatively, Kollsman charges $3,000 for altimeters, out of which 
it pays $300 for insurance to indemnify any loss to Lockheed from 
50. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). For a lucid de-
scription of the Federal Aviation Agency investigation of this accident, see Hunt, The 
Case of Flight 320, THE NEW YORKER, April 30, 1960, at 119, reprinted in W. 
HADDON, E. SUCHMAN & D. KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND APPROACHES 
721 (1964). 
51. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963 ). 
52. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). 
53. 70 Cal. 2d at 587, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657. 
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altimeter-caused accidents. In other words, Kollsman may contract 
to pay Lockheed for any and all tort losses caused by altimeters. 
It may be, however, that in light of its greater specialization in 
altimeters and thus its specialized insurance, Kollsman can insure 
altimeters more cheaply than could Lockheed-at $200, for ex-
ample. In that event, even though the court puts tort liability on 
Lockheed, Kollsman will contract with Lockheed to price altimeters 
somewhere between $2,900 and $3,000, with the $100 savings split 
between Lockheed and Kollsman on the basis of their bargaining 
strength. In other words, the actual distribution of the $100 savings 
will be determined by contract rather than by tort, but there will be 
that $100 to split. r,4 
The Kollsman court, then, implicitly acknowledged Gust as the 
court explicitly stated in Elmore) that a continuous bargaining rela-
tionship may render unimportant the decision as to who will bear 
the actual tort liability. On the other hand, courts are much more 
cautious when they consider contracts that vary the rights of individ-
ual consumers-especially with reference to personal injury. The 
judiciary obviously distinguishes between the reshifting of tort rights 
as between commercial establishments, such as airlines and aircraft 
and component parts manufacturers, and the reshifting of tort rights 
as between such parties and airline travelers.:;:; 
The distinction is not without justification. Allowing sophisti-
cated commercial parties to contract away tort liability on the basis 
of economic theory makes sense, but economic theory as applied 
to employees who suffered personal injury proved terribly unrealistic 
in one historic battleground of social legislation. Prior to the intro-
duction of workers' compensation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in England and the United States, economists 
often opined that workers' compensation would have no effect on 
the relative financial positions of the parties. If an employer had 
to pay workers' compensation premiums, it was argued, he would 
pass all or part of the costs on in the form of lower wages; if he 
didn't have to pay for workers' compensation, he would be obliged 
54. For a much more elegant and complete discussion of the greater subtleties 
involved in deciding upon the proper risk-bearer for purposes of resource allocation 
among victim, airline, aircraft manufacturer, and component parts manufacturer, see 
Klemme, The E111erprise Liability Theory of Torts, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 201-09 
(1976). 
55. But see the dissent by Judge Burke in Goldberg, wherein he mentioned, as 
a reason for not stretching common-law rules to compensate air victims, that avia-
tion accident insurance "is readily available [to air travelers] at moderate rates." 
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 438, 191 N.E.2d 81, 84, 
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1963). 
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to pay higher wages so that the employees could use the extra money 
to buy accident insurance for themselves. 56 With the exception of 
the economists who still solemnly parade the above argument before 
their classes, few persons tod'ay would, as a practical matter, assert 
that such thinking should have served as a basis for rejecting workers' 
compensation. 57 
The subject of workers' compensation reveals the practical flaws 
in Professor Epstein's proposal for freewheeling contractual abroga-
tion or alteration of tort law by doctors, manufacturers and others 
dealing with individual patients and customers. Assume for the 
moment that we did not have workers' compensation legislation and 
instead left workers to their common-law tort rights. Assume 
further that, as is the case with product liability and medical malprac-
tice, tort liability for industrial accidents was costing huge amounts, 
but payments to injured victims were dilatory and relatively infre-
quent, and the bulk of insurance dollars was spent on insurance over-
head and legal fees. Professor Epstein would apparently suggest 
that employers be allowed untrammeled freedom to contract with 
their employees to abolish or severely limit common-law liability for 
personal injury. Yet that solution would have been deemed politi-
cally and legally dubious even in the early part of the century,58 when 
workers' compensation was being enacted, and it is most unlikely that 
any legislator or insurance commissioner would today authorize, or 
any court enforce, such contracts. 50 
IV. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE FOR Loss ALLOCATION 
As we have seen, the government-whether acting through the 
legislative, executive or judicial branch--does not favor contracts in 
which potential accident victims have waived their tort remedies. I 
suggested not long ago that a partial solution to products liability 
woes, at least for capital goods manufacturers, is to allow employers, 
employees (through their unions) and third parties to contract away 
employee tort remedies (in the form of products liability claims) 
against third parties; the resultant savings in products liability pre-
56. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 39, at 531 and 601 respectively. 
51. See id. 
58. Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (1906). But see Wells Fargo 
& Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920). Cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 
498 (1900). 
59. See O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An An-
swer to Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435, 436-50 [hereinafter cited as Bargaining for Waivers], re-
printed in part in 1976 INS, L.J. 530, 541-45. See also notes 31-33 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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miums would be divided up among the employers, employees and third 
parties on the basis of their bargaining. 00 Presumably, the union's 
presence in the bargaining would guarantee that at least some of the 
savings in products liability insurance would go to the employees in 
the form of privately negotiated supplements to often-inadequate 
workers' compensation benefits or to other fringe benefits. 
The reason why waiver of these tort rights might be approved 
by the courts, whereas other contracts stripping potential victims of 
their tort rights would not, is that workers' compensation benefits 
provide a compensatory base. 61 Courts would probably react differ-
ently to the abolition of uncertain and wasteful tort liability insurance 
where alternative remedies assure more certain, even if considerably 
lower, recoveries for injury victims. 62 In other words, a contract can 
replace tort only where the basic benefits supposedly furnished by 
tort are not lost and perhaps, indeed, are thereby improved. Thus, 
simple abrogation of tort remedies (as Epstein suggests) would prob-
ably fail. It is significant that Professor Epstein asserts that 
first-party benefits, such as health insurance, are a better source of 
compensation than tort liability for injuries in the course of medical 
treatment, and that he uses the existence or potential existence of 
60. O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers, supra note 59. For a precis of the article 
in nontechnical terms, see O'Connell, Bypassing t/ze Lawyers, Wall St. J., April 8, 
1976, at 20, col. 4. 
61. But see O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers, supra note 59, at 448 and 538 
respectively. See also notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text. 
62. See generally O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers, supra note 59. This is 
why I argue that my original proposal for elective no-fault insurance could be ex-
pected to meet with both legislative and judicial approval. Under that proposal 
anyone-including businesses or professionals--would be allowed to elect to pay 
for medical expense or wage loss from injuries caused by a particular product or 
service without regard to fault. Businesses or professionals would have the option 
of electing all or just selected risks of personal injury typically created by their 
product or service and would agree to pay for any out-of-pocket losses when injury 
results from those nonelected risks. To the extent-and only to the extent-that a 
guarantee of such no-fault payment existed at the time of the accident, no claim 
based on fault would be allowed. There would be several incentives to substitute 
no-fault liability in place of traditional liability based on fault. Although businesses 
or professionals might have to pay more injury victims, they would normally pay 
each victim less. Moreover, they would not have to pay anything where payment for 
loss had already been made from collateral sources such as sick leaves; nor would 
they have to pay for pain and suffering, which now constitute the bulk of personal 
injury payments. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 23; O'Connell, Elective No-Fault 
Liability Insurance for All Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal, 1973 INS. L.J. 495 
(precis of the book); O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 1915 INS. 
L.J. 261; O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract-With or Without an 
Enabling Statute, 1915 U. ILL. L.F. 59 (discussion of implementing the proposal by 
contract, even without an enabling statute, and defending the validity of such con-
tracts). For succinct presentations of this elective no-fault proposal available to the 
practicing lawyer, see O'Connell, Products and Services: No-Fault Without Legisla-
tion, 62 A.B.A.J. 343 (1976); O'Connell, It's Time for No-Fault for All Kinds of 
Injuries, 60 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1974). 
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such benefits as an argument for the feasibility of abolishing tort 
rights by contract. 63 But such benefits are so inadequate for many 
people that the courts will not likely allow them to serve as the only 
source of compensation after injuries are inflicted by tortfeasors. 
Even with the enactment of national health insurance, there will be 
too many losses not covered by first-party or social insurance for the 
courts to allow tort liability simply to be abolished. For serious 
injuries-including those stemming from automobile accidents, med-
ical treatment and manufactured products-approximately seventy-
five per cent of nonproperty losses are wage losses, and only about 
twenty-five per cent are due to medical expenses. 64 No one is seri-
ously suggesting that national health insurance include in the imme-
diate future-or perhaps ever-coverage for middle-class wage 
loss. 65 Thus, huge uncompensated losses will remain after private 
and social insurance payments have been made. 
Unlike most traditional insurance schemes, workers' compensa-
tion not only covers the full amount of medical expenses but also 
guarantees recovery of substantial wage losses to accident victims. 
Accordingly, exclusive reliance on workers' compensation benefits 
for all industrial accidents might well be feasible. Even so, political 
reality or the doctrine of unconscionability will probably require sup-
plementation of workers' compensation benefits by the savings pro-
duced by the abolition of common-law tort liability. 
And yet, proponents of coupling enhanced workers' compensa-
tion benefits with contractual waiver of tort rights cannot ignore 
Professor Gilmore's dour view of the viability of contract. 66 Labor 
law, like insurance law (both of which are applicable to collective 
bargaining over waiver of tort liability rights), is a classic area in 
which contract is dead, replaced largely by the Byzantine world of 
statutory and administrative rules under the National Labor Relations 
63. Epstein, supra note 28, at 149. 
64. For serious automobile accidents 74 per cent of injury losses are wage loss, 
22 per cent medical loss and 4 per cent other losses. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, 
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LoSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 6 (March 1971) (figures computed 
using the losses listed in the Table 2 for Medical Expense, Wage Loss and Other 
Expenses). For medical malpractice cases, 74 per cent of injury losses are wage 
loss, 24 per cent medical loss and 2 per cent other expenses. INSURANCE SERVICES 
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ALL-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, SPECIAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW: 
1974 CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 35 (Dec. 
1975). For product liability cases, 74 per cent of injury losses are wage loss, 21 
per cent medical loss, and 5 percent other expenses. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 
PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, 1976 PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSE-CLAIM SURVEY; 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 34 (Dec. 1976). 
65. See J. O'Connell, supra note 23, at 76. 
66. See G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87-99. 
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Act and its state offshoots.07 Very complex issues are involved in 
the question whether management· can bargain with unions for the 
waiver of union members' tort rights. 68 Intuitively, it seems that this 
can be done, but legitimate doubts about the validity of such con-
tracts will inhibit their formation. In addition, one union official has 
voiced other concerns about undertaking and implementing such 
bargaining: 
First, even if we could clarify the complexities of this issue to all 
our business representatives and local union bargaining committees 
throughout the United States and Canada, we would still have [prob-
lems]. 
. . . [S]uppose we bargained away our members' [tort] rights 
through negotiations with Company A-which buys capital equip-
ment from Company B. How much effect would this actually have 
on insurance rates paid by Company B-if Company B still has third-
party liability in relation to all of the other companies with whom it 
does business? To be effective, waiver of third-party tort claims 
would have to be almost universal. Bargaining by a few unions in 
scattered localities would not have any real impact on premium rates 
and this would not generate a margin convertible into [other ben-
efits] .... 00 
On the other hand, workers' compensation does offer a rich area 
for further exploration of the possibility of substituting no-fault for 
fault-based coverage.70 I have recently suggested that this change 
be achieved by statute-specifically, that workers' compensation 
benefits be raised in return for the establishment of workers' compen-
sation as the sole remedy for industrial accident victims as against any 
third-party employer covered by workers' compensation. 71 In order to 
avoid excessive externalities, however, this proposal also contem-
plates that employers paying workers' compensation be allowed a 
right over against such third parties to the extent of workers' com-
67. The most dramatic changes touching the significance of contract law in 
modern life • . . came about, not through internal developments in contract law, 
but through developments in public policy which systematically robbed con-
tract of its subject-matter ..• [such as] labor law [and] .•• insurance law. 
. • . The growth of these specialized bodies of public policy removed from 
"contract" . . . transactions and situations formerly governed by it . . • • 
L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 24 (1965), quoted in G. GILMORE, supra 
note 1, at 7. 
68. See O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers, supra note 59, at 462-67. 
69. Private communication to the author. 
70. According to one study, about one half of the total liability payments for 
personal injury goes to employees injured in the course of employment and therefore 
presumably already covered by workers' compensation. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 
PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 64, at 59. For similar estimates of the 
disproportionate number of product liability claims involving industrial accidents, 
see O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Work-
ers Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees, With an Employers Remedy 
Against Third Parties, 1976 !Ns. L.J. 683, 684-85. 
71. Id. 
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pensation benefits, perhaps on the basis of comparative fault as be-
tween the employer and the third party.72 Otherwise, such third 
parties would cast the entire burden derived from their faulty 
products onto their purchasers. Although this right over will neces-
sitate the expense of determining issues of fault, the issue will pre-
sumably arise between two insurers; accordingly, these claims will 
probably not be litigated extensively but rather will be handled ex-
peditiously. 73 
As to the relatively rare situation in which third parties not sub-
ject to workers' compensation injure an on-the-job employee (as in 
the case of a motorist in a pleasure vehicle who runs into an em-
ployee driving in the course of employment), there is obviously no 
reason to extend the tort exemption to such a third party. By defini-
tion, he is not paying increased workers' compensations benefits as 
a quid pro quo for relief from tort obligations. But there is, argu-
ably, also no reason to allow the employee injured in these unusual 
circumstances to have both his fault-based and no-fault claim. The 
third possibility is novel but not unprecedented: to allow the em-
ployer to assert the entire tort claim for all the proceeds, including 
damages for pain and suffering, to help reimburse the payment of 
increased workers' compensation benefits. Similar provisions have 
a long history of use in Canadian workers' compensation law, under 
which the workers' compensation fund asserts the employees' third-
party tort claim and keeps all the proceeds, including amounts paid 
for the employees' pain and suffering.74 
72. Id. at 685-86. 
As to the use of comparative fault, since an employer is obligated to pay for all 
employee injuries regardless of the employer's lack of fault, it could instead be pro-
vided that in such third-party claims to gain funds to help finance no-fault workers' 
compensation, an employer's fault need not be a factor. In other words, just as the 
employer's fault-or lack of it-is irrelevant for the purposes of his contribution to 
the no-fault fund, so too might his fault be considered irrelevant in gaining contribu-
tion to the fund from a faulty third party causing a drain on the fund. This indeed 
is the law today in many states concerning employers' rights of subrogation or in-
demnity against third parties. 
In either case, any right over against the third party might be permitted only on 
ground of negligence-not strict liability-since workers' compensation employers 
are not necessarily worse risk-bearers than their third-party suppliers or other third 
parties. It should be kept in mind that it was the tortfeasor's supposedly better risk-
bearing capacity vis-a-vis his injured victim that gave rise to the application of the 
doctrine of strict liability. 
73. A precedent for expeditious handling of inter-company claims is the elaborate 
inter-company arbitration system for dealing with collision insurers' claims against 
property-damage liability insurers for car damage. 
74. See, e.g., N.S. STAT., ch. 65, § 1(1) 14 (1967-68) (Nova Scotia); P.E.I. 
REV. STAT. ch. W-10, § 11(3) (1974) (Prince Edward Island). Other Canadian 
statutes with similar provisions have recently been amended to limit the compensa-
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For the purpose of this article, it is striking how this statutory 
device to handle a rather small part of on-the-job accidents opens up 
much wider possibilities for replacing traditional tort claims with con-
tracts that provide no-fault benefits for off-the-job accidents. 76 Why 
not allow, for example, workers' compensation insurers to contract 
with employees to pay them and their families workers' compensa-
tion benefits for off-the-job accidents, in return for an assignment 
of the entire tort claim of each injured employee or his family mem-
ber? No one would be compelled to offer such coverage for off-
the-job accidents or compelled to buy it. In order to prevent adverse 
selection, the election by the employee would have to take place prior 
to the accident-presumably either at the time of employment or at 
the time the no-fault coverage is offered to the employees as a group. 
Given the preference of most potential and actual accident victims 
for certainty of payment for out-of-pocket losses, as opposed to the 
gamble of tort litigation, 76 there would almost certainly be a favor-
able reaction to the offer of such no-fault coverage. This scheme 
need not be limited to offers by workers' compensation insurers for 
workers' compensation benefits. For example, auto insurers in 
Michigan, which has extensive no-fault auto insurance benefits, 77 
could offer the equivalent of no-fault auto benefits to their insureds 
and families for other than motoring or industrial accidents. 78 Other 
casualty or disability insurance carriers could offer similar coverage 
on the same terms to members of credit unions, or professional and 
trade associations. In all cases, the coverage would be limited to 
the following: (1) out-of-pocket loss, and not damages for pain and 
tion fund to the amount of compensation paid to the injured worker, with the excess 
going to the employee. See, e.g., ONT. STAT. ch. 143, § 4(3) (1968), 
Similarly, American workers' compensation laws also originally allowed em-
ployers to assert the employees' entire tort remedy for the employers' sole benefit 
(where the employee accepted workers' compensation benefits). See R. KEETON, 
INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT§ 3.lO(c), at 160-61 (1971). 
75. The proposal is offered only in outline form; a forthcoming article in the 
University of Illinois Law Forum will describe it in much greater detail. 
, 16. See U.S. DEPT, OF TRANSPORTATION', PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD Auro IN-
SURANCE: A REPORT OF TIIE SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 9-10 (1970); J. O'CONNELL & W. WILSON, 
CAR INSURANCE AND CONSUMER DESIRES 9-24 (1969); O'Connell & Simon, Payment 
for Pain and Suffering: Wlzo Wants What, When and Wlzy?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 
33. For a comprehensive review of the public opinion surveys on no-fault versus tort 
liability insurance, see O'Connell & Wilson, Public Opinion on No-Fault Auto Insur-
ance: A Survey of the Surveys, 1970 U. ILL, L.F. 307. Although these studies only 
apply to auto accidents, the public's aversion to the tort liability process would seem 
to apply to other accidents as well. See generally J. O'CONNELL, supra note 23, at 
112-15. 
77. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1976). 
78. Concerning the benefits under Michigan's no-fault law, see O'Connell, supra 
note 17, at 39-41 and 164-66 respectively. 
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suffering; (2) losses above compensation from collateral sources 
such as Blue Cross and sick leave benefits; and (3) moderate wage 
loss (up to, say, $150 or $200 per week). Deductibles and over-all 
limits could be used to limit still further the possibility' of prohibitive 
costs. 
A first-party insurer offering such no-fault insurance would be 
in a position to market it subject to a dividend based on the return 
from the resultant tort suits. It should be noted in this regard that 
the great virtue of no-fault insurance has not proved to be its lower 
c9st (although it might have this effect) but rather its more efficient 
use of insurance dollars, particularly for the seriously injured. 79 
Michigan's experience demonstrates that no-fault can provide higher, 
more predictable benefits to victims of automobile accidents. 80 In 
addition, there have been substantial amounts available for victims of 
catastrophic accidents in which no other vehicle was involved and 
in which, accordingly, there would have been no payment in a fault-
based system. 
The device proposed in this article allows the insurance industry 
to attempt to harness the tort system and make it work for its own 
and the public's advantage. There seems to be an almost uniform 
feeling among insurance executives that the present tort system is 
running amok, not only in auto liability but in product, medical mal-
practice, municipal, and occupiers' liability as well. But despite such 
an overwhelming consensus, insurance executives despair of getting 
courts or legislators to do much about it. Even if the fragmented 
insurance industry could decide on a course of action, it must then 
deal with the courts and legislators of fifty states, as well as the federal 
government. 81 
On the other hand, under the proposal made here, insurance 
companies can begin to experiment with contracts that are much 
more valuable to the public than tort liability; they can do so without 
waiting for a legislative intervention and can thereby deal with tort 
claims among themselves. 
In a sense, this proposal allows experimentation with an ingeni-
ous idea recently advanced by economist Melvin Reder. 82 Although 
even Reder admits that his idea is probably unworkable in its present 
form, his analysis is nonetheless very illuminating. Reder starts 
79. See id. at 39-42. 
80. See id. at 39-41. 
81. The Overload on the Nation's Insurance System, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 6, 1976, 
at 46, 48. 
82. M. Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to Medical 
Malpractice (paper prepared for AEI Conference, see note 31 supra). 
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from the premise that plaintiffs' lawyers in personal injury cases have 
a clear advantage over plaintiffs as far as "portfolio diversification" 
is concerned. Lawyers handle many different claims, whereas 
normally a claimant has only one in a lifetime. Thus, lawyers are 
in a far better position to undertake the risks of pursuing a tort claim. 
That, at bottom, explains why we allow the claimant to sell a substan-
tial portion-frequently one third-of his claim in the form of the 
contingent fee contract. In other words, contingent fees, which are 
well-nigh universal in personal injury claims, reflect the fact that such 
a claim is a risky asset that is in part transferable. Especially when 
it is combined with the widespread practice of the plaintiff's lawyer 
assuming all the costs of preparing the case (including the costs of 
exhibits, etc.), the contingent fee, as Reder points out, allows the 
claimant to transfer a portion of his equity in his claim to his lawyer 
in return for the latter's services. 
Logically, argues Reder, we should allow the plaintiffs to trans-
fer the entire claim. Being risk averse, the typical injury victim 
would be willing to sell all or at least most of his "risky asset," and 
the logical buyer would be his lawyer, who has already bought a por-
tion through the contingent fee. On the other hand, as Reder ad-
mits, prohibitions of maintenance and champerty render it unethical 
for a lawyer to purchase outright for cash his client's entire claim. 83 
But even if plaintiffs' lawyers were allowed to buy tort claims, they 
would want to split the risk further by contract. A given case, after 
all, might- require an attorney to invest a significant portion of his 
annual income in preparation for trial. "Normal desire for portfolio 
diversification (i.e., risk aversion) would suggest the sale or ex-
change of shares in large claims, at least among lawyers. And it 
is quite possible that this actually occurs; the practice of engaging 
a referring attorney as co-counsel may be one method by which attor-
neys pool their risks; partnerships may be another."84 If one com-
83. Id. But given the inapplicability to my proposal of the reasons behind the 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty, they should pose no barrier. Cf. Grant v. 
Stecker & Huff, 300 Mich. 174, 1 N.W.2d 500 (1942). 
Reder also maintains that: 
even if there were no legal impediments to doing so, often it would be ineffi-
cient to eliminate all interest of a claimant in the settlement of his claim. Where 
he must be available as a witness, or as an exhibit, in the event of a trial; or 
where his public conduct, prior to settlement, might influence the outcome by 
providing evidence as to the extent of his injuries, the victim's performance will 
tend to be more conducive to a successful outcome if he retains a financial 
stake in the matter. 
Reder, supra note 82. However, it may well be that the traditional obligation under 
liability insurance contracts of an insured to cooperate in the defense of an action can 
be extended to the prosecution of an action. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: 
BASIC ToxT § 7.5, at 458-61 ( 1971). 
84. Reder, supra note 82. 
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pares the distribution of risks on the plaintiffs' side to the defense 
side in personal injury cases, Reder argues, one immediately per-
ceives how diversified is the risk from the defense side, in contrast 
to the plai:p.tiffs' side. "[O]n the defense side the principals are, 
with few exceptions, insured; and the insurers are legally free to 
reinsure or otherwise engage in mutually advantageous exchanges 
of risk."85 On the plaintiffs' side, apart from selling one third of 
his claim to his lawyer, the plaintiff is locked into a much less diver-
sified portfolio than he would want. 
The proposal described in this article effectively allows pursuit 
of the goal toward which Reder struggles. Under it, the sale of the 
victim's highly uncertain tort claim would be to an even better risk-
bearer than a lawyer or group of lawyers-an insurance company 
with all the stability and fairness that the law demands of such an 
enterprise. In addition, subsistence is guaranteed to the potential 
accident victim who sells his tort claim. Such a change seems to 
exemplify Paul Samuelson's comment in another context that "there 
are some things that are done so stupidly in a society, that everyone 
can gain [by change]. Once the overall situation is improved, 
there will be bribes for everybody."86 So "stupid" is the lawyers' 
tort law as it applies to personal injuries that everyone ( except trial 
lawyers, it must be admitted) will benefit if we allow contracts for 
no-fault coverage to replace tort claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By the devices87 described in the previous section, contract law 
can again be used in place of tort liability, but only within limits-
specifically, only where guarantees of substantial payment supplant 
the vicissitudes of traditional tort liability. In other words, it may 
not be so much a question of the death of contract or the death of 
tort. Instead, compensation will entail a cross-fertilization of the 
two, as- it long has. Consider the history of products liability: 
First, in 1842, in order to limit payment for personal injury, contract 
(specifically, the doctrine of privity) was used in a product liability 
case to get around the inadequacies of tort (specifically, the almost 
unlimited liability in tort to almost anyone); then, in 1916, in order 
to ensure more ready payment for personal injury, tort (specifically, 
liability for negligence regardless of the lack of privity) was used to 
85. Id. 
86. Quoted in L. SILK, THE EcoNOMISTS 40 (1976). 
87. In addition to my proposal for no-fault claims as a "sole remedy" for acci-
dent victims both on and off the job, consider also my proposal for elective no-fault 
insurance by potential tortfeasors. See note 62 supra. 
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get around the inadequacies of contract (namely privity); then, once 
again in order to ensure more ready payment for personal injury, con-
tract (specifically, the doctrine of warranty) was used increasingly in 
products liability cases to get around the inadequacies of tort (specif-
ically, such requirements as proof of negligence and the absence of 
contributory negligence); then, in order to ensure still readier pay-
ment, tort (specifically, the doctrine of strict liability) was used to 
get around the inadequacies of contract (specifically, such require-
ments as privity and notice under the doctrine of warranty); so now, 
in tum, to ensure readier payment still, contract (specifically, 
elective no-fault . . . [insurance]) should be used to get around the 
inadequacies of tort (specifically, such requirements as proof of 
defect under the doctrine of strict liability). 88 
Even Professor Gilmore, despite all his talk of the death of 
. contract, would seem to agree: 
"Products liability" is a term that has come into use only in recent 
years. Lawyers used to talk, more cumbersomely, of liability for 
breach of warranty, without bothering to make clear whether they 
were talking about liability in contract or liability in tort. Warranty 
law indeed has always had one foot in contract and the other foot 
in tort and this ambiguous straddle over the great legal divide has 
done a great deal to keep the legal discussion open-ended. Whenever 
a particular state of doctrine on one side or the other of the divide 
has seemed to present a roadblock to further progress, it has been 
possible to get around the obstacle by pointing out that the action is 
really in tort (if the roadblock is on the contract side) or really in con-
tract (if the roadblock is on the tort side). In days when the courts 
took the concept of "negligence" more seriously than they do now, the 
escape from carrying the burden of proof on that issue was to em-
phasize the absolute promissory nature of contract warranties; in the 
course of that demonstration there developed the vast and intricate 
structure of the law of implied warranties. In this century the road-
blocks have been located mostly on the contract side-the defenses 
of privity of contract, of disclaimer, of the plaintiff's failure to give 
timely notice of the defect-so that we have become accustomed to 
thinking of tort as providing the escape route. But if the going were 
to become rough in tort . . . we would no doubt revert almost 
instinctively to emphasizing the contract nature of the action. 80 
As illustrated by the past one hundred years or so of the inter-
locking development of tort and contract, it is only for the purpose of 
achieving progress toward abetting payment-not wholesale denial 
of it00-that we should turn once again from tort to contract. 
88. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault 
Insurance for Many J(inds of Injuries, supra note 34, at 533-34 (citations omitted). 
The elective no-fault being discussed was not that explained in notes 75-86 supra 
but the one under which potential tortfeasors could elect to pay on a no-fault basis 
in return for a tort exemption. Id. at 522-23. See note 87 supra. 
89. Gilmore, supra note 40, at 109-10. 
90. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text. 
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In essence, tort and contract are dying for opposite reasons: con-
tract, in trying to be orderly, is too unjust; tort, in trying to be just, 
is too disorderly. What is needed is the orderly, if· admittedly 
imperfect, justice of no-fault insurance, 01 with its mixture· of con-
tract and tort. 
91. See text at notes 18-19, 79-80 supra. 
